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Abstract 
This is a short response to a particular point made by our colleagues Wes 
Sharrock and Jeff Coulter (2004) in their otherwise convincing and 
devastating critique of the ‘Theory of Mind’ avatar of cognitivism. We 
think they have misunderstood what we once said about the use of ‘mental 
predicates’ and wish to clarify the point in question. 
 
 
In a footnote to their recent paper in Theory & Psychology, ‘ToM: A Critical 
Commentary’, Wes Sharrock and Jeff Coulter begin a criticism of one of our 
papers (McHoul and Rapley, 2003) as follows: 
 
McHoul and Rapley ... display only the narrowest of grasps on what 
Wittgenstein, for example, had to say about ‘mental predicates’: their 
central contention is that he denied that they were names standing for 
‘internal’ referents. They then proceed to attack a doctrine they call 
‘Coulterism’ (after one of us), which asserts that if such predicates are used 
in certain non-referential ways, then their users are ‘misguided’ (p. 519). 
(Sharrock and Coulter, 2004, p. 597; our emphasis) 
 
On the first point: it is true that we confine ourselves to a particular aspect of 
Wittgenstein’s complex position on mental predicates (and related psychological 
terms), namely that they do not work referentially — by which we mean that they 
do not map directly on to ghostly (i.e., empirically unavailable) internal mental 
states or processes. Yet, this is among the theses he does in fact hold; and it may 
even be the central and most radically distinct of his ideas about such matters. We 
also take it that this strong anti-cognitivist position on psychological terms (or 
something close thereunto) has been central to Coulter’s own thinking since at 
least Rethinking Cognitive Theory (1983). 
 
However, we do not characterise the position which we call ‘Coulterism’ (a well-
meant shorthand for what ought properly to be called ‘the strong Wittgensteinian 
position’) as asserting that ‘if such predicates are used in certain non-referential 
ways, then their users are “misguided”’. To ascribe this to anyone (let alone 
Coulter!) would be to characterise their position as a sheer logical contradiction. 
That is, if mental predicates (and the like) cannot be referential, then non-
referentiality could not possibly be ‘mistaken’. On the contrary, it would be the 
norm. A more careful inspection of our original paper will show that, by contrast, 
we characterise that position as asserting as follows: if a strong Wittgensteinian holds, as he/she must, that mental predicates (and the like) cannot work 
referentially (in the above sense), then those persons, lay or professional, who do 
take them to be referential must be mistaken. This is a quite different proposition 
altogether and, we think, a reasonable summary of one of the consequences of 
radical anti-cognitivism. 
 
It will be clear from our paper that we are very sympathetic to this position, but 
with a single caveat: when applied to lay (as opposed to social scientific) usage, it 
can at least imply an ironic treatment of such (lay) usage on the part of the 
professional analyst. One way out around this problem, called ‘folk cognitivism’ 
(Bilmes, 1992), is the main focus of our attack on the page of the paper that 
Sharrock and Coulter refer to. It is to ‘folk cognitivism’ (not to the strong 
Wittgensteinian thesis) that we bring James Taylor’s mental Carolina and the rest, 
as the paper makes quite explicit. 
 
On a final note, we do have an outright apology to make to Jeff concerning the 
paper in question. We had simply forgotten that he discussed the ‘I just had a 
thought’ data (originally from Sacks) in his Rethinking Cognitive Theory (1983, pp. 
136-140). One of us happened, at the time we were working on the paper, to also 
be re-reading Sacks’s Aspects of the Sequential Organization of Conversation (1970) for 
another project and came upon those materials which then seemed just right as an 
example of how the predicate ‘having a thought’ (in this case at least) was better 
accounted for non-referentially (again, in the above sense) and, instead, in terms 
of its accomplishment as (to use Sacks’s term) an ‘“on topic” topic marker’. We 
should have remembered Jeff’s analysis — albeit that it was published, as he 
reminds us, more than twenty years ago. However, our description of Sacks’s 
analysis is, we still hold, quite accurate. If anything, our — again we emphasise — 
description of that analysis and pretty much everything else in the paper supports 
our own explicitly anti-cognitivist stance. To that extent, Sharrock and Coulter (p. 
584) cannot possibly conclude that we believe that ‘our language is mentalistic’. 
 
 
 
References 
 
 
Bilmes, J. (1992). Referring to internal occurrences: A reply to Coulter. Journal for 
the Theory of Social Behaviour, 22, 253-262. 
 
McHoul, A., & Rapley, M. (2003). What can psychological terms actually do? (Or: 
if Sigmund calls, tell him it didn’t work). Journal of Pragmatics, 35, 507-522. 
 
Sharrock, W., & Coulter, J. (2004). ToM: A critical commentary. Theory & 
Psychology, 14, 579-600. 
 Sacks, H. (1970). Aspects of the sequential organization of conversation. Unpublished 
book manuscript. 
 
 